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I.  Introduction 
States have and will continue to develop new methods of employing lethal force. On the 
horizon, for example, are developments in autonomous robotic systems5 and nano- and 
biotechnology,6 which raise a plethora of complex issues that the international community 
must address in coordinated ways. Armed drones (or ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’, or UAVs, 
fitted with weapons), called here merely ‘drones’, have moved from the horizon into the 
realm of the known. The attraction of drones is clear — in particular, they provide a 
strategic advantage of the deployment of deadly force against a remote target without 
exposing one’s own forces to risks.  
During the past decade or so, many States have become increasingly reliant on unmanned 
systems and in particular drones to deliver force in the context of military operations.7  By 
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the end of 2013, the US, for example, had over 20,000 unmanned systems.8 Drones have 
not only been used by the UK, USA, Israel and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 
operations outside their territory (in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, 
Gaza and Syria), they have also been used by Pakistan, Iraq and Nigeria within their own 
territory.9 In Pakistan, for example, it was reported that between 2004 and 2014, a 
minimum of 2,300 people were killed by US drone strikes.10 Of that number, 420 have been 
identified as civilians, amongst which were approximately 150 children.11 In Yemen, at least 
300 people have been killed to date, amongst them a minimum of 30 civilians.12  
 
Drones, it can safely be said, are here to stay. Indeed, it might even be said that unmanned 
systems, including drones, are the future of warfare. There is broad agreement that drones 
per se are not illegal weapons, in the sense of possessing characteristics that necessarily 
violate rules of international law.13 However, despite the fact that drones are now an 
established technology, there is, in some respects, a  lack of consensus on how to apply to 
drones the various rules of international law that regulate the use of lethal force, notably 
the ius ad bellum, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is 
the aim of this article to contribute toward clarifying the application of these different rules 
to drone warfare in particular from the perspective of the protection of the right to life, on 
which, it is submitted, all three of these areas of international law have a bearing. In 
particular, this article will explore a number of contested issues that arise in these three 
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areas of international law and the implications of these controversies for the regulation of 
armed drones. 
Drones can be expected to become increasingly sophisticated and smaller in form, as well as 
become cheaper and therefore more accessible. In addition, the technological skills needed 
to operate these systems are becoming readily available in different parts of the world. 
Drones are likely to form part of the arsenals of an increasing number of States that may be 
able to deploy such weapons across international borders in relatively non-intrusive ways, 
both on traditional ‘battlefields’ and for the purposes of pursuing targets far removed from 
what would traditionally be seen as the ‘zone of hostilities’. Some States may also wish to 
use armed drones in domestic law enforcement contexts, such as for border patrols, 
operations against organised crime, and crowd control in demonstrations. They may be 
hacked by enemies or other entities. Armed drones are also reportedly already within the 
arsenal of some non-State actors. In sum, the number of States and actors with the capacity 
to use drones is likely to increase significantly in the near future, underscoring the need for 
greater consensus on the terms of their use. 
One of the most important consequences of the expanding use of drones is that targeted 
killing across borders appears to be easier than in the past. This creates the potential for 
undermining the role that State sovereignty, irrespective of the controversies that 
admittedly surrounds this concept,  plays in sustaining the international security system. 
Indeed, the ready availability of drones may lead to situations where States that perceive 
their interests to be threatened increasingly engage in low-intensity, but drawn-out, 
applications of force that know few geographical or temporal boundaries.  
This would run counter to the notion that war — and the transnational use of force in 
general — is an exceptional situation of limited duration and scope, and that there should 
be a time for healing and recovery following conflict. An approach in terms of which 
peacetime is the exception, and armed conflict the norm, could have far-reaching 
consequences for the protection of the right to life. The laws specifically designed for 
wartime, international humanitarian law (IHL), offer less protection of life than does the 
default regime of international human rights law (IHRL), precisely because war is seen as an 
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exception.14 To the extent that war becomes the norm, the lower level of protection of life 
offered by IHL risks becoming seen as the default regime.  
II. The Applicable Legal Frameworks and the Relationship Between Them 
A number of substantive areas of international law implicate the right to life and, 
consequently, have a direct bearing on the legality of the use of armed drones. The two 
most directly relevant to the protection of the right to life are international humanitarian 
law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). Each of these regimes balances, albeit 
to different degrees, State security concerns on the one hand and the protection of 
individuals (including the protection of life) on the other. The third area of international law 
of particular importance to the use of drones is the law governing the use of force by one 
State on another State’s territory (ius ad bellum). These ad bellum rules form the 
cornerstone of the international security system and will determine the legality of the inter-
State use of armed drones.  
The law on the inter-State use of force serves in the first place to protect State sovereignty, 
but in doing so it also serves to protect individuals. Indeed, one might think of the ius ad 
bellum as an outer layer of protection of the right to life. The protection of State sovereignty 
and of territorial integrity – which in other ways often presents a barrier to the protection of 
human rights – can, in this sense, constitute an important component of the protection of 
individuals against lethal force, especially with the advent of armed drones, by containing 
the spread and intensity of armed conflicts. IHL and IHRL, by contrast, speak not to the 
inter-State use of force, but rather the specific features of a particular drone strike, such as 
how it is carried out, against whom it is carried out, and the consequences that follow. 
These differences notwithstanding, all three areas are closely related when discussing the 
use of lethal force across borders, and both international security and the protection of the 
right to life depend on the principle that the use of force is a matter of last resort. 
In order to examine the legality of a particular drone strike under international law, a 
holistic approach is therefore needed. For a particular drone strike to be lawful under 
international law, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international 
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legal regimes.15 Although a particular drone strike may satisfy the requirements of the ius ad 
bellum, it may still be inconsistent with applicable rules of IHL and IHRL, and thus unlawful 
under international law. And the opposite may also be true: whereas a drone strike by a 
State may appear to comply with applicable rules of IHL and IHRL, if it does not satisfy the 
conditions for lawful force under the ius ad bellum, it will constitute an unlawful act under 
international law, entailing the responsibility of the  State. 
The importance of taking an holistic approach here is illustrated well by the example of an 
action by a State taken in self-defence. As discussed in more detail below, a valid claim to be 
acting in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in response to an armed attack, 
may justify a use of armed force in another State’s territory. However, a valid claim by a 
State to act in self-defence for the purposes of Article 51 is irrelevant to that State’s 
compliance with those rules of IHL and IHRL that help to protect the right to life of those 
being targeted. Nor, as a matter of the secondary rules of State responsibility, can a valid 
claim to act in self-defence preclude the wrongfulness of conduct which otherwise violates 
applicable rules under IHL or IHRL.16 This position has been articulated clearly by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in its commentary to the Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Wrongful Acts. Although Article 21 of those Articles stipulates that lawful 
measures in self-defence will preclude the wrongfulness of an act, the ILC emphasised that: 
 
This is not to say that self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of conduct in all 
cases or with respect to all obligations. Examples relate to international 
humanitarian law and human rights obligations . . . As to obligations under 
international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human rights 
provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct.17  
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17 On the non-availability of self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness for breaches of IHL and 
IHRL, see International Law Commission (ILC), Commentary to Art 21, Articles on Responsibility of States for 
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Similarly, while the consent of a State on whose territory force is used can justify what 
would otherwise be regarded as an infringement of territorial integrity by that other 
State/attacking State, such consent will not be relevant to the compliance of either State 
with any applicable rules of IHRL and IHL. The obligations of States under IHRL18 and IHL19 
are not owed  on a bilateral, reciprocal basis, but rather to each and every State party to the 
relevant treaty, and, for those treaty rules that co-exist under customary international law, 
to all states. In addition, IHRL and (some) IHL obligations are owed directly to individuals 
entitled to protection under these legal regimes.  This nature of IHRL and IHL obligations 
means that one State cannot consent to another State violating the rights owed to 
individuals.20 Acts which violate these rights violate also the obligations owed to every other 
State party to the particular treaty (or to every other State in the case of obligations arising 
under customary international law) and the rights of individuals protected by the rules of 
IHRL.21 
Each of the legal regimes explored in this article is therefore relevant to a different aspect of 
the use of drones, and each must be considered separately. In seeking to contribute 
towards greater clarity, and at least to take stock of the applicable legal framework as a 
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whole, each of the three international legal regimes identified as relevant to the use of 
drones will be explored in turn.  
III. The Law Relating to the Use of Force on Foreign Territory 
We will begin by examining the law governing the inter-State use of force, the ius ad bellum, 
and its relevance for the employment of armed drones. The use by one State of drones to 
target individuals located in another State must in the first place comply with the rules on 
the inter-state use of force. While IHL and IHRL speak more directly to protection of the 
individuals affected by a drone strike, the law on the use of inter-State force focuses on 
state sovereignty; it serves primarily to protect the legal rights of States. This includes the 
right and interest of the State to have the lives of its citizens and inhabitants protected from 
acts of aggression. As was stated above, it can thus indirectly serve to protect life by 
containing the geographical spread of conflict. 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law prohibit the threat or use of 
inter-State force. A State may, however, consent to the use of force on its territory by 
another State, with the result that Article 2(4) will not be engaged. Where no consent is 
given, the UN Charter gives two exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition: where action is 
taken lawfully in self-defence under Article 51 and where the Security Council authorizes 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Given that it is in these areas that 
many controversies especially arise, consent and self-defence will be considered in turn for 
their relevance to the use of drones by States abroad. 
i. Consent 
Where a territorial State consents to another State targeting non-State actors on the 
former’s territory with drones, no issue in principle should arise under the ius ad bellum, for 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter will not have been violated.22 Indeed, consent has been given 
                                                 
22 It has been suggested that a State cannot invite another State to assist it in a civil war, such that where the 
domestic situation is so severe, the de jure government would not be able to consent to force being used on its 
territory by another State: see C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (OUP 2008) 81. However, it is 
not clear that there is sufficient State practice and opinio juris for such a limitation of the consent principle to 
be regarded as a part of international law: See Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (CUP 2011) 119; 
Akande & Vermeer, “The Airstrikes Against Islamic State in Iraq and the Alleged Prohibition on Military 
Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars”, EJIL:Talk! February 2, 2015 & Van Steenberghe, “The Alleged 
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by Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia which has then been relied upon by the U.S. to justify the 
use of drones in those territories; regarding Pakistan, this consent was subsequently 
withdrawn, whereas regarding Yemen and Somalia, though consent has not been 
withdrawn, the authority of those governments might call the validity of that consent into 
question.23 
 
While consent would seem a simple test that would result in a particular drone strike in 
foreign territory being consistent with the ius ad bellum, in practice there are issues of 
considerable difficulty surrounding consent, including who may give consent, whether 
consent must be made publicly and explicitly or could instead be implicit, and when consent 
could be considered to have been vitiated by coercion.24 
 
With regard to who may give consent, the fundamental nature of the prohibition of the use 
of force for State sovereignty means that only the State’s highest authorities may validly 
give consent – that is, have the authority to give consent - to a use of force.25 One cannot 
simply rely on the notion of attribution under the secondary rules on State responsibility by 
analogy, therefore. Although the acts of all government officials, acting in that capacity, are 
attributable to the government, not all parts of the government are entitled to give consent 
with respect to the use of force. In particular, it is not sufficient to obtain consent from 
regional authorities or from particular agencies or departments of government. The 
International Law Commission has made it clear that: 
 
“[w]hether a particular person or entity had the authority to grant consent in a given case is 
a separate question from whether the conduct of that person or entity was                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prohibition on Intervening in Civil Wars is Still Alive After the Airstrikes Against the Islamic State in Iraq: A 
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23 M Byrne, ‘Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘Intervention by Invitation’ as a Basis for US 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen’ (2016) 3 J Use of Force in Intl L 97. 
24 The controversies surrounding the issue of consent more generally are discussed in J Crawford, The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 
2002) 163–5. 
25 See O Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law 
(Hart 2010) 259: “In the case of a military operation, no one contests that only the highest authorities of the 
State are able to issue such consent validly. It is only on this condition that it can be claimed that a use of force 
is not directed against the State’s independence and so does not violate article 2(4).” 
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attributable to the State  . . . For example, the issue has arisen whether consent expressed 
by a regional authority could legitimize the sending of foreign troops into the territory of a 
State, or whether such consent could only be given by the central Government, and such 
questions are not resolved by saying that the acts of the regional authority are attributable 
to the State . . .”26 
 
The answer to the question of which domestic authority is entitled to give consent to what 
would otherwise constitute a violation of international law depends on the interplay 
between international and domestic law. In the first place, one needs to consider the nature 
of the international rule in question and the manner in which that rule is generally applied.27 
As already stated, the importance of the prohibition on the use of force suggests that 
consent to a departure from this rule will usually need to be established at the highest levels 
of government. Secondly, one will need to consider the domestic arrangements made with 
respect to the matter at hand.28 Where domestic law or domestic constitutional 
arrangements are such as to give responsibility on these issues to lower level officials this 
may be taken into account.  
 
However, it would be natural that where there is a difference of view between the highest 
authorities in government and lower level officials, it is the view of the higher level officials 
that should be taken as determinative. This arises in part because international law itself 
assumes that certain organs of government have the capacity to represent the State in 
international affairs. Thus, the Head of State, Head of Government and the Foreign Minister 
are presumed, as a matter of international law, to have plenary competence to conclude 
treaties on behalf of the State.29 In addition, these senior government officials are accorded 
                                                 
26 See ILC Commentary to Art. 20, Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, para 5. 
27 The ILC has stated that: “Who has authority to consent to a departure from a particular rule may depend on 
the rule. It is one thing to consent to a search of embassy premises, another to the establishment of a military 
base on the territory of a State. Different officials or agencies may have authority in different contexts, in 
accordance with the arrangements made by each State and general principles of actual and ostensible 
authority”: ibid, para 6. 
28 It has also been argued that where a State’s actions on another’s State’s territory are consented to by the 
latter, the former should inquire into whether this consent complies with the latter’s domestic law: A Deeks, 
‘Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy’ (2013) 54 Harvard Intl LJ 1. 
29 Art. 7 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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immunity ratione personae from the jurisdiction of other States because of their privileged 
position in conducting international relations on behalf of the State.30 Thus, it can be 
assumed that it is the view of these officials, where expressed, that should be determinative 
of whether the State gives consent or not to the use of force on the State’s territory. 
Importantly, the view that consent to the use of force must be given by the highest 
authorities in the central government of a State accords with the bulk of international 
practice.31 
 
Regarding the issue of publicity and consent, while there does not appear to be a 
requirement that consent be made public, it must nevertheless be clear as between the 
States concerned that consent is being given to the use of force, and the parameters of that 
consent should also be made clear. Consent must be given in advance.32 Moreover: 
 
 “. . . certain modalities need to be observed for consent to be considered valid. Consent 
must be freely given and clearly established. It must be actually expressed by the State 
rather than merely presumed on the basis that the State would have consented if it had 
been asked. Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion. In this respect, 
the principles concerning the validity of consent to treaties provide relevant guidance.”33 
 
Consent on so serious a matter as the use of force is not to be implied. Furthermore, where 
force exceeds the limits of the consent given, that force will be a violation of Article 2(4).34 
In addition, once consent to the use of force is withdrawn, the State conducting targeting 
                                                 
30 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, paras 53-55; D Akande and S Shah, 
‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts (2010) 21 EJIL 815, 818 f. 
31 Corten, (n 24) 266: “In respect of all the precedents just examined, it appears clearly that, to be validly given, 
consent to external intervention must have been given by the highest authorities of the State such as the 
Prime Minister, the President or the Government as a whole.” 
32 “Consent to the commission of otherwise wrongful conduct may be given by a State in advance or even at 
the time it is occurring. By contrast, cases of consent given after the conduct has occurred are a form of waiver 
or acquiescence, leading to loss of the right to invoke responsibility”: ILC Commentary to Art. 20, Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part 
Two. 
33 See ILC Commentary to Art. 20, Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, para 6. 
34 Ibid, para 9: “where consent is relied on  . . .  it will be necessary to show that the conduct fell within the 
limits of the consent.” 
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operations is bound by international law to refrain from conducting any further operations 
from that moment onwards (unless there is a separate justification for using force).35  
 
ii. Self-defence 
Where no consent is given, Article 2(4) will be engaged by a drone strike on another State’s 
territory, requiring resort to one of two exceptions to the prohibition contained in the UN 
Charter. The most common exception invoked by States using drones in these situations is 
self-defense.36 International law poses stringent conditions on the use of force in self-
defence. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law, a State may 
invoke self-defence to justify its use of force to target individuals on another State’s 
territory where an armed attack against it occurs or is imminent (on which see below).  The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed that, for an attack to constitute an “armed 
attack” and thus enable the State’s right to use force in self-defence, the scale and effects of 
the attack must reach a certain threshold of gravity.37 Thus, not any use of force against a 
State will necessarily justify a response in self-defence; rather, only the most grave uses of 
force can do so. 
In addition to the requirement of an armed attack, the State claiming to be acting in self-
defence must also satisfy the dual requirements of necessity and proportionality, grounded 
in customary international law.38 These requirements, as defined in the context of the ius ad 
bellum, are closely linked to the important issue of the aim of an act of self-defence. Thus, 
‘necessity and proportionality mean that self-defence must not be retaliatory or punitive; 
                                                 
35 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 105, where the ICJ took the view that Ugandan presence in the DRC was 
unlawful from the moment when consent was withdrawn (despite an agreement setting out modalities for 
withdrawal). 
36 The U.S. and UK, for example, rely on self-defence: US Department of Justice White Paper, ‘Lawfulness of a 
Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an 
Associated Force’ (made public 5 February 2013); E MacAskill, Drone Killing of British Citizens In Syria Marks 
Major Departure for UK, The Guardian, 7 September 2015. 
37 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 191; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v United States) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, paras 51, 
62. 
38 The ICJ has on numerous occasions highlighted the need for a response to an armed attack to be necessary 
and proportionate for that to constitute lawful self-defence: see Nicaragua (n 37), para 194; Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] IC Rep 226, para 41; Oil Platforms (n 37), para 74; 
DRC v Uganda (n 35), para 147. 
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the aim should be to halt and repel an attack.’39 In other words, action taken lawfully in self-
defence (i.e. the use of drones to target individuals in another State’s territory) must serve 
the purpose of halting and repelling an armed attack and must be both necessary and 
proportionate to this end.40 Action taken after an armed attack has ended, and which in 
reality seeks to retaliate against that armed attack, would not constitute a lawful exercise of 
self-defence, but rather an armed reprisal in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.41 In 
considering the elements relevant to determining whether a particular action is necessary 
and proportionate to the aim of self-defence, the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case placed 
emphasis on the nature of the objects targeted by the US and their role in staging any initial 
armed attacks.42 
 
The requirements of necessity and proportionality also help to define the limits of the right 
to self-defence. The right persists only for so long as it is necessary to halt or repel an armed 
attack and must be proportionate to that aim. However, that is not to say that, in 
determining what is necessary to bring an attack to an end and what is a legitimate 
objective for self-defence, States are entitled to continue to act in self-defence until the 
absolute destruction of the enemy is achieved such that the enemy poses no long term 
threats. International law cannot permit States to act until the elimination of long term 
threats is secured. The law of self-defence permits responses to emergency situations in 
which States face immediate or imminent risks. Once the immediate or imminent threats of 
(continued) attack are resolved, States will need to find other methods of securing long 
term peace and stability.  
                                                 
39 Gray (n 22) 150; see also Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (OUP, 3rded., 2012) & Akande & Liefländer, “Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and 
Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense”, (2013) 107 AJIL 563, 569. 
40 The manner in which the requirements of necessity and proportionality have been invoked by the ICJ 
confirms this interpretation of the purpose of lawful self-defence: see, e.g., Nicaragua (note n 37Error! 
Bookmark not defined.), para 237 (holding that US actions in and against Nicaragua were not necessary as the 
threat to the Salvadorian government had already been curbed by other means); Oil Platforms (n 37Error! 
Bookmark not defined.), para 76 (holding that the US attacks against Iranian oil platforms were not necessary 
to respond to the attacks against US ships); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 38), 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, para 5 (‘…the concept of proportionality referred to was that which was 
proportionate to repelling the attack, and not a requirement of symmetry between the mode of the initial 
attack and the mode of response …’). 
41 Oil Platforms (n 37), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Elaraby, para 1.2. 
42 Oil Platforms (n 37). 
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To permit force to be used as a means of achieving long term securitywhere the threat of 
immediate or imminent attacks has receded, is to permit perpetual warfare. Therefore, 
even when drones are used in self-defence, consideration needs to be given to the moment 
when the group against which drones are being used is sufficiently disrupted such that it no 
longer poses an immediate or imminent threat. 
The question of “imminence” raises a further controversial point of considerable 
importance to the use of armed drones abroad. Article 51 recognises the right to self-
defence where “an armed attack occurs”, but also refers to self-defence as an “inherent” 
right of States. This has given rise to arguments that the right to self-defence under 
customary law is not displaced by the Charter. Importantly, the argument that an 
anticipatory attack against an imminent threat is permissible rests on this basis.43 There is a 
significant debate about the legality of action in self-defence prior to an actual armed 
attack. However, as the Report of the High-Level Panel Established by the UN Secretary-
General noted: ‘Long-established customary international law makes it clear that States can 
take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
deflect it, and the action is proportionate’.44 The UK, for example, takes the view that action 
in self-defence can be lawful where an armed attack is imminent.45  
Importantly, at most anticipatory self-defence could be lawful only in response to an 
existing threat. It may not be employed pre-emptively to prevent a threat from arising in the 
future. The necessity of self-defence, according to the well-known construction, “must be 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation”.46 The 
body of opinion and State practice that rejects the concept of anticipatory self-defence 
altogether should also be noted, and serves at least as a confirmation of the limited scope of 
the exception.47  
                                                 
43  Report of the High-Level Panel Established by the UN Secretary-General (December 2004) UN doc A/59/565 
(2004) at 188–92.  
44 Ibid. 
45 ‘Attorney-General’s Advice on the Iraq War, Iraq: Resolution 1441’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 767, 768. 
46 Letter from Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton, August 6, 1842 in RY Jennings, ‘Caroline and McLeod Cases’ 
(1938) 32 AJIL 82. 
47 Gray, (n 22), 160-1. 
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Finally, it must be emphasized that the imminence requirement in IHRL which stipulates that 
force may be used only to protect life, is not to be conflated with the requirement of 
imminence in the law governing the use of force on foreign territory under Article 51. The 
former is a condition required for all uses of lethal force to be lawful under IHRL. The latter 
applies under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence and the legality of a use of force on 
another State’s territory under the ius ad bellum.48 This is consistent with one of the key 
themes of the present article, that separate assessments of the legality of drone strikes 
under each applicable branch of international law must be undertaken. 
A further controversy that must also be considered here concerns self-defence measures 
taken in a foreign State against non-State actors who do not act on behalf of that foreign 
State. This question is of particular importance given that non-State actors are currently 
being targeted by drones in States that do not necessarily bear responsibility for the acts of 
those actors. 49 Prior to 9/11, the claim that force could be used in self-defence in response 
to an armed attack by a non-State group whose acts were not attributable to a State was 
controversial at best.50 The International Court of Justice rejected this view of the law in the 
Nicaragua case.51  
 
However, State practice since the events of 11 September 2001 suggests that international 
law now permits such a notion of self-defence. The shift began with the near universal 
support for the US and UK’s response in Afghanistan to the 9/11 attacks, which was based 
on a claim to be acting in self-defence against a non-State group operating from a State 
where the actions of that group could not be said to be attributable to the territorial State.52 
Indeed, following the events of 9/11, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1368 and 
1373, both of which recognised ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
                                                 
48 Contrast the US Department of Justice White Paper, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a 
U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force” (5 February 2013). 
49 See references above at nn 7–12 for recent articles detailing drone strikes by the UK and US against non-
State actors in a number of different countries. 
50 See discussion of pre-9/11 practice in Gray (n 22) 195–8. 
51 Nicaragua (n 36), para 195. 
52 See, e.g., the US’ letter to the Security Council under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in which it referred to its 
right to self-defence against Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that was allowing its territory to 
be used by Al-Qaida: UN doc S/2001/946. The same claim was made by the UK: UN doc S/2001/947. 
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accordance with the Charter’.53 This would suggest that a State may use force in self-
defence on another State’s territory, where that first State has been the victim of an armed 
attack by non-State groups operating on the latter’s territory, even where that attack is not 
attributable to the ‘host’ State.  
 
In contrast, the ICJ in its Israeli Wall advisory opinion subsequently implied that inter-state 
force cannot be used in self-defence in response to an armed attack by a non-State actor: 
 
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of 
self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. 
However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a 
foreign State.54 
 
Nonetheless, State practice relating to the use of force abroad against non-State actors, 
since 2001, is now broad and extensive, and indeed it extends beyond the immediate post-
9/11 context.55 Following this practice, and despite academic controversy,56 the law on this 
matter, appears to have changed.  
 
However, even if States may, in certain circumstances, lawfully exercise self-defence in 
response to an armed attack against a non-State actor, this only means that the armed 
attack requirement can be fulfilled without attribution of the attack to a State. Other 
customary international law requirements would still need to be fulfilled before a State can 
                                                 
53 UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (12 September 2001), S/RES/1368/2001, preambular para 3; Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001), S/RES/1373 (2001), preambular para 4. 
54 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
[2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 139. It is to be noted that Article 51 does not, in fact, condition the notion of armed 
attack as emanating from a State only. 
55 For example, since 9/11 one may refer to Uganda and Rwanda’s use of force in the DRC; Kenya and 
Ethiopia’s use of force in Somalia; Russia’s use of force in Georgia; Israel’s use of force against Hezbollah in 
Lebanon; Turkey’s repeated use of force in northern Iraq; Saudi Arabia’s use of force in Yemen; Colombia’s use 
of force in Ecuador; the use of force by many States in Syria against ISIS. As Christian Tams notes, ‘[t]he 
situations in which force has been used (or a corresponding right has been asserted) vary considerably, but 
have almost exclusively been explained as exercises in self-defence’: C Tams, ‘The Use of Force Against 
Terrorists’, (2009) 20 EJIL 359, 378. 
56 See generally, Tams, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorists’, (2009) 20 EJIL 359; Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: 
Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defence’, (2012) 52 Va. J.I.L. 483 & Hakimi, ‘Defensive 
Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play”, (2015) 91 Int. Law Studies; Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of 
Force Against Non-State Actors (2010, OUP), Part I. 
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respond with force in self-defence on the territory of another State. In particular, it must be 
necessary and proportionate to respond with force to an armed attack (or imminent armed 
attack) from a non-State actor. In the context of a use of force against a non-State group, it 
is suggested that the necessity condition would only be satisfied where the territorial State 
itself is either unable or unwilling to prevent continued attacks.57 It is worth emphasising 
that this test of whether the territorial State is unable or unwilling to act is not an 
independent legal standard but merely an application of long-standing criterion of necessity. 
In determining whether a State is unable or unwilling to take action, the State acting in self-
defence might be required to request such action prior to the commencement of acts taken 
in self-defence.58  
 
Finally, Article 51 of the UN Charter makes it clear that measures adopted by States in 
exercise of self-defence must be reported to the UN Security Council.59 This can be seen as 
posing an obligation of transparency and justification to the international community, 
placing the issue formally on the agenda of the Security Council and recognising its role. All 
member States of the UN have an obligation under its founding treaty to submit such 
reports. While failure to report will not render unlawful an otherwise lawful action taken in 
self-defence, “the absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the 
State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence”.60 According to 
Article 51 the right to exercise self-defence shall continue “until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. This demonstrates 
that the end-point of an action in self-defence is not only determined by the principles of 
necessity and proportionality, noted above, but may also be determined by the Security 
Council.61 
                                                 
57 K Trapp, ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist 
Actors’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 141; D Bethlehem, ‘Self Defence Against an Actual or Imminent Armed Attack by Non-
State Actors’ (2012) 106 AJIL 770, 776. 
58 Bethlehem, ibid. 
59 Nicaragua (n 37), para 235; DRC v Uganda (n 35), 222, para 145. 
60 Ibid, para 200. 
61 Randelzhofer (n 39) 804. 
17 
 
In addition to its transparency function, it could be argued that the rationale for this 
reporting requirement is to contribute towards the protection of the legal rights of 
sovereignty by the international community, since the State using force is required to offer 
its justification for that use of force. By extension, it must be concluded that a State must 
report afresh when the material facts have changed — for example, where self-defence is 
used as a basis for the use of force on the territory of a new State, or where new parties are 
added to the conflict. 
 
IV. International Humanitarian Law 
Having considered a number of the varied issues that arise in applying the rules under the 
ius ad bellum to the use of armed drones by States, this section will now explore the second 
key body of international law of relevance here, that is, international humanitarian law 
(IHL). IHL applies only where there is a situation of either international or non-international 
armed conflict. As such, whether a particular drone strike is regulated by IHL will depend on 
whether that strike falls within the context of one of these types of armed conflict. If a 
drone strike does not take place in the context of an armed conflict, IHL will not apply, and 
the applicable rules of IHRL will continue exclusively to govern the use of lethal force. The 
test whether an armed conflict exists is an objective, factual one and is not determined by 
the subjective views as to the characterization of the situation by the parties involved. This 
section will consider some of the key controversies in the application of IHL to drone strikes.   
i. The threshold for non-international armed conflict 
Where a State targets non-State actors abroad, that act may, depending on the fulfilment of 
other conditions, take place in the context of a non-international armed conflict,62 and thus 
be governed by the rules of IHL applicable in that type of conflict. Classification of situations 
as international or non-international armed conflicts depends primarily on the question of 
who are the parties to the conflict. Conflict between States, are, according to Common 
Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, international armed conflicts. Violence between a 
                                                 
62 Unless the non-State group acts on behalf of a foreign State, in which the conflict would be international. 
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State and an organized non-State armed group, or between two or more such groups, may 
be a non-international armed conflict. It is generally accepted that a non-international 
armed conflict may take place across State boundaries, with the phrase ‘ “non-
international” referring not to the territorial scope of the conflict but to the status of the 
parties.63 
Drones have thus far typically not been used in inter-State conflict. The question thus arises 
whether they are being used in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). For violence to 
amount to a non-international armed conflict there must be ‘protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.’64 Two cumulative criteria must thus be satisfied in order for a particular 
situation to be classified as a non-international armed conflict to which IHL would apply: 
‘the intensity of the conflict and the organisation of the parties to the conflict’ (emphasis 
added).65 Thus, an armed group will only be considered to constitute a party to a NIAC if it is 
sufficiently organized. International jurisprudence has determined the relevant indicative 
criteria, which include, inter alia, the existence of a command structure, headquarters, and a 
group’s ability to plan and carry out military operations.66  
Moreover, for a conflict to qualify as a NIAC, armed violence must also reach a certain 
threshold of intensity which is higher than that of internal disturbances and tensions.67 The 
armed violence should not be sporadic or isolated but protracted.68 The requirement of 
protracted violence “refers more to the intensity of the armed violence than its duration.”69 
                                                 
63 Thus, the wording of Common Article 3 to 1949 Geneva Conventions which speaks of a non-international 
armed conflict in the territory of one of the parties is regarded as requiring only the fighting takes place at 
least on the territory of one party to the Geneva Conventions.  On this, see Hamdan v Rumsfeld , 542 US 507 
(2004); N Lubell, ‘The War (?) Against Al-Qaeda’, in E Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the Classification 
of Conflicts (OUP 2012) 432–3; D Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’, in 
Wilmshurst, ibid, 72. 
64 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1 (2 
October 1995), para 70. 
65 Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997), para 562. 
66 Prosecutor v Limaj and others, Case No. IT-03-66-A, 30 November 2005, paras 94-134; Prosecutor v Lubanga, 
No ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012, paras 536-538. 
67 Art. 1(2) of Additional Protocol II of 1977; Prosecutor v Musema (Appeals Judgment) ICTR-96-13-A (16 
November 2001), para 248. 
68 Musema, Ibid. 
69 Prosecutor v Haradinaj and others Judgment (Trial Chamber) IT-04-84-T ICTY (3 April 2008) para 49; 
Prosecutor v Limaj et.al (n 66) para 90. 
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Like the condition of organization, the intensity of the armed violence is an issue which is 
determined on a case by case basis.70  
In the context of drones, these requirements mean that IHL will not apply where the 
threshold levels of violence or organization are not present, leaving IHRL to govern the 
situation alone. It should be noted that individual drone strikes by themselves are not likely 
to meet the necessary threshold of violence for a NIAC to come into existence, leaving IHL 
inapplicable unless a drone strike is used in the context of a pre-existing NIAC. 
A number of controversies have, however, arisen with regard to the scope of non-
international armed conflicts and the threshold criteria for their existence, as a result of 
claims made by particular States when employing armed drones abroad. For example, 
where a State employs armed drones against members of the same non-state group in a 
number of different territories, the question arises as to whether the violence between the 
State and non-State group should be treated as a single, global non-international armed 
conflict.71 The consequence of following such an approach would be that, when assessing 
whether the intensity threshold for a non-international armed conflict had been met, one 
would aggregate the entirety of the violence between the State and non-State group across 
the globe. It might be argued that where a State targets members of the same (sufficiently 
organised) non-State armed group, with which it is already in a non-international armed 
conflict, in a number of different States, a single, global non-international armed conflict 
exists, with the relevant rules of IHL applying to all such strikes.72 If this approach is 
followed, the intensity requirement could be met by aggregation of violence, rather than by 
examining the level of violence in each country. The result of such an approach is that, on 
                                                 
70 Musema (n 67), para 249.  
71 See, e.g. the ICRC’s criticisms of the view that the international fight against terrorism constitutes a single, 
transnational non-international armed conflict: ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: 
Questions and Answers, 1 January 2011, available at 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/terrorism-faq-
050504.htm#Dosomeaspectsofthefightagainstterrorismamounttoatransnationalarmedconflict>. 
72 See, e.g., N Lubell and N Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed 
Conflict’, (2013) 11 J Intl Crim Justice 65. Amongst the many pieces written on this issue from the perspective 
of drone strikes, see, e.g., L Blank, ‘Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counter-Terrorism: 
Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat’ (2010) 39 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1; K Anderson, ‘Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether 
There is a ‘‘Legal Geography of War’’’ (2011) Washington College of Law Research Paper No 2011–12; J Daskal, 
‘The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the ‘‘Hot’’ Conflict Zone’ 
(2013) 161 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1165. 
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some views, the less protective rules of IHL will apply in such cases to those targeted and 
exclude or modify the more protective rules of IHRL. Under this model, unsuspecting 
communities, far away from any battlefield, may lawfully be significantly affected so long as 
they are not disproportionately so (on proportionality, see below).  
This does, of course, depends on one’s view of the interaction between IHL and IHRL in this 
area. If the ICJ’s approach to the interaction between IHL and the right to life under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is applied equally in non-
international armed conflicts,73 then the right to life of the person targeted would not be 
violated so long as IHL is complied with.  
The possibility of a non-international armed conflict which spans across more than one 
country could certainly only exist where the individuals against which the State uses force in 
those several countries are actually members of the same non-State group.74 This is because 
the violence can only be part of the same armed conflict if it is between the same parties. 
Where violence is between entities that are not parties to the same conflict, that violence is 
not part of the existing non-international armed conflict. Thus, in a supposed global non-
international armed conflict, the organized armed group criterion would have to be tested 
on a global basis.75 Where there is no single organization that groups together all those 
fighting then the test for an organization would not be met, and                                                                                                                                  
one could not aggregate all the violence together for the purposes of the intensity criterion. 
There is clearly an incentive for states that are engaged in military clashes to define the 
group with whom they are engaged so broadly as to capture those not really members 
thereof, so as to bring them all within the same non-international armed conflict. The way in 
which the existing organization criterion under IHL has been interpreted to some extent 
helps to protect against this. An armed group is a party to a non-international armed conflict 
if, and only if, it is sufficiently organized in accordance with the demands of IHL. An armed 
                                                 
73 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 38), para 25. 
74 See Lubell and Derejko ( n 72), 78 stating that where the individuals targeted by drone strikes are not 
members of the same non-State armed groups with which the targeting State is already in an armed conflict, 
‘it will become necessary to show that a separate armed conflict exists between the state and the targeted 
armed group’).  
75 Lubell and Derejko (n 72) (‘It is, however, highly questionable as to whether a one-sided drone strike can 
meet the threshold of intensity for armed conflict … It is therefore submitted here that drone strikes alone are 
unlikely to be sufficient for the determination of a NIAC and the ensuing applicability of IHL’). 
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group will only be sufficiently organised to be a party to a non-international armed conflict, 
if there is ‘a sufficient body of evidence pointing to the . . . [group] being an organized 
military force, with an official joint command structure, [and] headquarters ...’76 Moreover 
the group should have “a unified military strategy” and be “able to speak with one voice”.77 
Importantly, this is a factual, objective test, immune from the political considerations of the 
attacking State; it is not, therefore, for the State party to a NIAC to define for itself what 
constitutes the armed group against which it is fighting. 
A related controversy arising from the use by certain States of drones against non-State 
armed groups abroad involves claims by certain States that force may be used not only 
against an organized armed group in a situation that meets the above requirements but also 
against its co-belligerents (or “affiliates” or “associates”).78 Co-belligerency is a concept that 
applies in international armed conflicts and entails that a sovereign State becomes a party 
to a conflict either through formal or informal processes.79 A treaty of alliance may be 
concluded as a formal process, while the informal process could involve providing assistance 
to or establishing a “common cause” with belligerent forces.80  
Transposing the concept of co-belligerency into non-international armed conflicts has been 
met with resistance because it ignores the significant differences between the two types of 
armed conflict and opens the door for an expansion of targeting without clear limits.81 
Where the individuals targeted are not part of the same command and control structures as 
the organized armed group or are not part of a single military hierarchical structure, they 
ought not to be regarded as part of the same group, even if there are close ties between the 
different groups.82  As a result, one cannot aggregate the violence between the State and 
                                                 
76 Prosecutor v Milosevic (Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal) IT-02-54-T (16 June 2004), para 23. 
77 Haradinaj (n 69), para 60. 
78 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address; C 
Bradley and J Goldsmith, ‘Congressional authorization and the war on terrorism’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law 
Review 2112, 2113. 
79 H Lauterpacht (ed), Oppenheim, International Law: A treatise (1935), 203, 206. 
80 Ibid. 
81 “The [U.S.] administration’s failure to define what specific organizational features or conduct would lead a 
group to be classified as an associated force raises concerns that this results in an aggressive and indefinitely 
expansive scope of targeting authority”: Amnesty International, Statement of shared concerns regarding U.S. 
drone strikes and targeted killings, AI Index: AMR 51/017/2013, 6. 
82  For what constitutes an armed group, see Haradinaj (n 69), 144-145. 
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these different armed groups as part of the determination as to whether the threshold for 
non-international armed conflicts has been met. Violence by different organized armed 
groups against the same State can amount to non-international armed conflicts only where 
the intensity of violence between each group and the State individually crosses the intensity 
threshold. 
To illustrate the points made above, one may make reference to the possibility of a single, 
global non-international armed conflict with Al Qaeda, for which it was stated that “[t]here 
is little evidence that the various terrorist groups that call themselves AQ or associate 
themselves with AQ possess the kind of integrated command structure that would justify 
considering them a single party involved in a global NIAC with the US . . . Indeed, even the 
US government rejects the idea that AQ is a unified organization, dividing AQ into three 
separate tiers.”83 The view of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was that, 
based on the facts, this type of NIAC was not and has not been taking place. Instead, a case 
by case approach to legally analyzing and classifying the various situations of violence that 
have occurred in the fight against terrorism should be applied. Seen in this light, some of 
these situations may be classified as an international armed conflict, others as NIACs, while 
the rest may be outside any armed conflict.84 
A final, important point must be emphasised here, in keeping with the general theme of this 
article that each applicable legal regime must be addressed separately to determine the 
legality of a particular drone strike under international law. Even if the concept of a global 
non-international armed conflict is accepted, IHL does not, on its own, determine whether 
armed force can be used in foreign States. IHL simply governs how force may be used and 
does not regulate whether or when armed force may be used. It is the ius ad bellum which 
determines whether force may be used on foreign territory and which restrains the 
extraterritorial use of force.  Thus, accepting the possibility of a global non-international 
armed conflict between a State and a non-State group does not in itself give permission to 
States to use force on foreign territory. Whether a State can carry the fight to a(nother) 
foreign territory will depend on the law relating to the use of force. The State seeking to 
                                                 
83 Heller, n. 15. 
84 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 2011, 10 f. 
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carry out a drone attack in a particular foreign State will need to show that there is a 
sufficient, and indeed, separate justification under the law relating to the use of force for 
any attacks on each individual foreign State territory. 
ii. Who may be targeted under the law of non-international armed conflict? 
Once it has been established that a non-international armed conflict exists, and thus that 
the rules of IHL applicable in such situations apply in the specific case, the next question 
concerns who may be targeted. The law of non-international armed conflict is less settled in 
this area than the law of international armed conflict. It is clear that, as a matter of both 
treaty and customary law, civilians may not be made the object of an attack unless, and for 
such time as, they take a direct part in hostilities (DPH).85 This is the principle of distinction 
and constitutes one of the cardinal principles of targeting under IHL. Where there is doubt 
as to whether a person is a civilian or is taking a direct part in hostilities, civilian status must 
be presumed.86 
The treaty rules applicable in non-international armed conflict, however, do not define 
‘civilian’, and there have been debates about whether members of non-state armed groups 
may be targeted on the basis of their status alone (e.g. as combatants can in international 
armed conflicts). In its Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, the ICRC 
has taken the view that “civilians” protected from direct attack in a NIAC are all those who 
are neither members of a State’s armed forces nor members of organized armed groups. The 
latter are then defined as “individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in 
hostilities (‘continuous combat function’ or CCF)”.87 They may be targeted based on their 
status alone.  
                                                 
85 Art 13(2) and (3) of Additional Protocol II of 1977. See also J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules (CUP 2005), Rule 6. 
86 Art 13(2) and (3) of Additional Protocol II of 1977; Art 50(1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
87 ICRC (Melzer), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009), 27. See also S Sivakumaran, The 
Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012), 359–62. Others adopt a different approach to defining 
membership of organized armed groups see, e.g., See Y Dinstein et al , The Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict: With Commentary (International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2006); K Watkin, 
‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive 
Guidance’ (2010) 42 NYU J Intl L & Pol 641. 
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Thus, where a drone strike is carried out against an individual with a continuous combat 
function in an organized armed group with which the attacking State is engaged in a NIAC, 
this will be consistent with the principle of distinction in IHL, though of course the other 
applicable rules of IHL also must be observed. However, ‘recruiters, trainers, financiers and 
propagandists may continuously contribute to the general war effort of a non-State party, 
but they are not members of an organized armed group belonging to that party unless their 
function additionally includes activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities.’88 
Such persons, therefore, remain civilians, protected against attack unless they directly 
participate in hostilities.  
In addition to targeting on the basis of status, individuals may be targeted as result of 
conduct they have undertaken. Therefore, civilians will lose their protection from direct 
attack where, and for such time as, they take a direct part in hostilities. According to the 
ICRC there is a three-stage (cumulative) test for determining when a civilian is directly 
participating in hostilities and thus may be targeted.89 In order for activity to qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities:  
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons 
or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); 2. There must be a direct 
causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a 
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation); and 3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus).90  
The most important criterion with respect to direct participation in hostilities is the 
requirement that the civilian either carries out acts that directly cause harm or engages in an 
operation that directly causes harm.91 The ICRC has defined this requirement narrowly, 
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stating that ‘direct causation should be understood as meaning that the harm in question 
must be brought about in one causal step.’92 General production and transport of weapons, 
or recruiting and training of personnel, is considered too indirect, unless forming an integral 
part of a specific military operation.93  
The ICRC also emphasises the rule that civilians lose their immunity from attack only for so 
long as they directly participate in hostilities, stating that ‘[c]ivilians lose protection against 
direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities.’94 However, the ICRC Guidance also states that ‘[m]easures preparatory to the 
execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to 
and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that act.’95 As 
such, a civilian will be participating directly in hostilities both during the commission of the 
act and for a certain period before and after the act is carried out.  
The ICRC’s concept of “continuous combat function” may be criticized because of its lack of 
an authoritative basis in treaty law. However, it has the advantage of answering the question 
of who is a legitimate target by referring to activity that directly causes harm to belligerents 
and/or civilians. This provides some objective basis for determining who may be targeted. It 
is noteworthy that the ICRC’s approach to the concepts of “members of organised armed 
groups” and “direct participation in hostilities” has been followed in recent State practice 
concerning drone attacks.96 Indeed, many would accept that members of an organised non-
State armed group that is party to a non-international armed conflict are not to be regarded 
as civilians and are therefore not immune from attack.  
However, the ICRC’s “continuous combat function” test has also been criticised for not going 
far enough,97 in the sense that it provides advantages to non-State groups as compared to 
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State forces and thus promotes inequality between belligerents.98 There is an imbalance 
under the combined combat function approach to since members of the State’s armed 
forces without a combat role (with limited exceptions) are lawful targets, whereas their 
counterparts in non-State groups are not. Furthermore, since the continuous combat 
function is defined by reference to taking a direct part in hostilities, which is then itself 
narrowly defined, persons who join an organized armed group and perform military 
functions that do not constitute direct battlefield activity are exempt from targeting on the 
basis of status. It has therefore been suggested that an analogy should be drawn between 
members of regular armed forces and members of organized armed groups such that 
persons who perform the types of functions performed by members of the armed forces 
would not be considered a civilian. Although superficially attractive as it promotes equality 
of arms, the problem with this latter approach is that the functions performed by members 
of the regular armed forces are very broad indeed. Since non-State groups do not necessarily 
have formal indicia of membership, one would still need some criteria for identifying the 
membership of an organized armed group.  
One of the critical questions with regard to targeted killing in any armed conflict is how to 
ensure that the persons being targeted are indeed legitimate targets. A loose test of 
membership of a group that cannot be applied on the basis of objective evidence is likely to 
lead to greater civilian casualties or at least a lack of public confidence in the operations. In 
all cases where a State uses lethal force against individuals in a non-international armed 
conflict there must be objective evidence to support the claim of membership of an armed 
group, or alternatively that the persons in question are taking a direct part in hostilities at 
that point in time. Furthermore, as noted above, where there is doubt as to whether a 
person is a civilian or is taking a direct part in hostilities, the person is to be presumed as 
protected from direct attack.99  
Moreover, all feasible precautions must be taken in determining whether a person is a 
civilian, and, if so, whether the person is taking a direct part in hostilities.100 This obligation 
requires parties to the conflict to use all information that is reasonably available in making 
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the determination about whether a person is a lawful target. Where drones are used for 
targeting it could be argued that there is a greater degree of responsibility to take 
precautions than might otherwise be the case. This is because the technology and the way 
in which it is used in many cases make long term surveillance possible. This means that 
more information is available about targets and more information can be made available 
than might otherwise be possible. Therefore, the assessment as to what information is 
reasonably available should take into account the relative ease with which information can 
be acquired.  
 
It will not always be the case that evidence that a person is a member of an armed group or 
is directly participating in hostilities arises from information known about or which reveals 
the identity of the individual. In some cases, evidence about membership in an armed group 
or direct participation will arise from the characteristics associated with the individual or the 
activity that the individual is known to have performed or is performing. For example, where 
a non-State group has a particular uniform or insignia evidence of membership may be 
derived from the wearing of that uniform or insignia. Strikes based on these “signatures” or 
defining characteristics of an individual are not per se unlawful. What is crucial is whether 
the signatures or characteristics that are being used in making targeting decisions are the 
relevant characteristics as a matter of law.101 The characteristics must be relevant to a 
determination that a person is a member of an armed group or that the person is taking a 
direct part in hostilities. The information must be such as to provide a high degree of 
confidence that the legal tests have been satisfied.  
A determination that individuals are military-age males in an area of known terrorist activity 
does not provide a high degree of confidence that the individual is either a member of an 
armed group or that the person is taking a direct part in hostilities at that particular time. 
Indeed, mere presence in a given locality can never, in itself, amount to direct participation 
in hostilities. Some specific act would need to be engaged in for the person to be considered 
to be taking a part in hostilities. Furthermore, the fact that a person is armed, even in areas 
that are known to contain terrorists, is not sufficient to constitute evidence of loss of civilian 
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status or direct participation in hostilities.102 There are many parts of the world where it is 
lawful and/or common for individuals to carry personal arms. Carrying of such arms will not 
be sufficient to displace the presumption of civilian status. The public statements of States 
that they conduct threat assessments of individuals before targeting them in armed conflict 
should be welcomed and should be urged, as this helps to raise the floor of protection with 
respect to legitimate targets.103 Of course, the situation must be correctly classified as an 
international or, as is more likely, a non-international armed conflict; if the requirements 
posed for a NIAC are not met, a loose threat assessment is not enough, and the more 
rigorous conditions of self-defence under IHRL would then exclusively regulate who can be 
targeted. 
Finally, even in cases where lethal force is targeted at a member of an organized armed 
group or a civilian directly participating in hostilities, any such strike would need to comply 
with the principle of proportionality, the second cardinal principle of targeting in IHL. 
Drones come from the sky, but they leave the heavy footprint of war on the communities 
they target.104  According to this principle, it is prohibited to carry out “an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated”.105 By implication, where the use of force is not 
excessive, such losses are regarded as incidental damage and are not prohibited provided 
the IHL rules have been respected.  
 
The risk to civilians may be exacerbated where drone strikes are carried out far away from 
areas of actual combat operations, especially in densely populated areas, where 
unsuspecting civilians may suddenly find themselves in the line of fire. Avoiding  harm to 
civilians requires taking all feasible precautions to prevent or minimize incidental loss of 
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civilian lives and to gather information relating to possible civilian casualties and military 
advantages that might result from the proposed operation.106 
 
iii. The possible existence of an international armed conflict 
As noted above, where there is an conflict between a State and a non-State group, it may 
qualify as a non-international armed conflict (should the conditions for a NIAC be met). 
Drone strikes may also take place in circumstances where there is no NIAC between the 
State and the non-State group, because the criteria for the existence of a NIAC  are not met. 
However, the absence of a non-international armed conflict between the State and the non-
State armed group does not necessarily mean that IHL will not apply to the use of force by a 
State. This is because the use of lethal force by a State directed at an armed group may still 
be governed by the law relating to international armed conflicts. 
 
As noted earlier, international armed conflicts are limited to conflicts between States. When 
a State carries out drone strikes on the territory of another State, it will either do so with 
the consent of the territorial State or without that consent. Where the force is used with the 
consent of the territorial State, there can only be a non-international armed conflict 
between the State and the group against whom force is used (or indeed not armed conflict 
at all). However, where force is used without the consent of the territorial State, one of the 
present authors has argued  (as have others and the ICRC) elsewhere that there would be an 
international armed conflict between the State using force and the State on whose territory 
force is used.107 This would be an international armed conflict between the foreign State 
and the territorial State. This could be the case because the use of force by the intervening 
foreign State on the territory of the territorial State, without the consent of the latter, is a 
use of force against the territorial State. This, so the argument goes, is so even if the use of 
force is not directed against the governmental structures of the territorial State, or if the 
purpose of the use of force is not to coerce the territorial State in any particular way.  
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However, even on the view that there is an international armed conflict between the two 
States, such a conflict would exist in parallel with the non-international armed conflict 
between the State and the non-State armed group that is being targeted, if the criteria for a 
NIAC were met. The two conflicts would thus exist simultaneously.  With regard to targeting 
of the members of the non-state group, it would be the criteria discussed above from the 
law of non-international armed conflict that would be determinative of the legality of the 
targeting of such members.108 This is so because, as seen from the Tadić criteria discussed 
above,109 the hostilities between the State and non-state group constitute the essence of a 
non-international armed conflict. Failure to apply the law of non-international armed 
conflict to targeting of members of the group would in effect be a failure to recognize the 
non-international armed conflict.  
 
In cases where drone strikes occur outside the context of non-international armed conflicts 
and without the consent of the territorial State, on this view the individuals targeted would 
necessarily be classified as civilians, given that they would not constitute combatants in the 
international armed conflict between the two States.110 IHL prescribes that such persons 
would be protected from direct attack,111 unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.112 Drones strikes against them would, therefore, on this view only be lawful so 
long as they are directly participating in hostilities (on which, see above). 
 
Finally, the fact that drone strikes would, according to this approach, take place in the 
context of an international armed conflict means that additional rules of international law to 
those discussed thus far would apply. For example, in addition to all the IHL obligations of 
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the State using lethal force applying in such a situation, the applicable principles of 
international criminal law with respect to war crimes in an international armed conflict will 
also be relevant in determining individual responsibility for particular strikes. This 
conception of the relevant legal framework under IHL where drones are used abroad 
without the territorial State’s consent thus has important implications both for substantive 
primary rules and for secondary rules on the responsibility of the actors involved.  
 
iv. Does IHL require a capture rather than kill approach? 
 
Recent debates have raised the issue of whether IHL requires that a party to an armed 
conflict, under certain circumstances, considers the capture of an otherwise lawful target 
(i.e. a combatant, a member of an armed group with a CCF or a civilian directly participating 
in hostilities) rather than targeting with force. The ICRC has taken the view that it does, and 
in its Interpretive Guidance, it states that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an 
adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where there 
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”113 
The articulation of this principle has been controversial.114 It has been criticized for its 
alleged misrepresentation of the current lex lata,115 particularly on the basis that it suggests 
that the principle of military necessity sits above every rule of IHL in a limiting manner, 
rather than simply as a consideration that has already been factored into the rules.116 In 
other words, so the argument goes, States have already decided that it is necessary and 
proportionate to target combatants on the basis of their status, and in some cases, conduct 
alone. 
It is too early to determine in which direction the controversy around this concept will be 
resolved. The impulse to move in the direction of the approach that in some cases capture 
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rather than kill is required will likely continue in the context of modern anti-terrorism 
measures where individuals or small groups may be isolated in territory far away from the 
conflict zone, which may even be controlled by the State party or its allies.117 At least one 
State that uses drones has stated that, as a matter of policy, it will not use lethal force when 
it is feasible to capture a terror suspect.118 At the same time it should be remembered that 
drones by their very nature will in most cases not allow capture. 
v. Investigation and accountability for violations 
The modern concept of human rights is based on the fundamental principle that those 
responsible for violations must be held to account. A failure to investigate and where 
applicable punish those responsible for violations of the right to life in itself is increasingly 
understood to constitute a violation of that right.119 Legal, and indeed political, 
accountability are dependent on public access to the relevant information.120 Only on the 
basis of such information can effective oversight and enforcement take place. The first step 
towards securing human rights in this context is transparency about the use of drones. A 
lack of appropriate transparency and accountability concerning the deployment of drones 
undermines the rule of law and may threaten international security.121 Accountability for 
violations of IHRL (or IHL) “is not a matter of choice or policy; it is a duty under domestic and 
international law.”122 
The various components of transparency123 require that the criteria for targeting and the 
authority which approves killings be known, and drone operations be brought within 
                                                 
117 R Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 24 EJIL 819. 
118 White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (23 May 2013). 
119 Kaya v Turkey, Application No. 22729/93, Judgement of 19 February 1998, para 86-92; UNHRC, General 
Comment No. 31 (2004), para 15; McCann and others v United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91, Judgment 
of 27 September 1995, para 169. 
120 See the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles on the Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (recommended by the UN Economic and Social 
Council resolution 1989/65, 24 May 1989), para 16, and the companion UN Manual on the Effective Prevention 
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (sometimes referred to as the “Minnesota 
Protocol”). 
121 Melzer (n 15), 4. 
122 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 12 April 
2011. 
123 See P Alston, ‘The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders’ (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Journal 287. 
33 
 
institutions which are able to disclose to the public the methods and findings of their 
intelligence, criteria used in selection of targets and precautions incorporated in such 
criteria. One of the criticisms leveled against the current drone programs has been the 
absence of an official record regarding the persons killed.  States must also give guarantees 
of non-repetition of unlawful drone strikes and realize the right of victims to reparations. 
Drone victims, like any other human rights victims, and the society at large, have a right to 
access information related to allegations of human rights violations and their 
investigations.124 Under IHRL, the UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized the need 
for transparency, highlighting victims’ right to know the truth about the perpetrators, their 
accomplices and the motives thereof.125 Likewise, during an armed conflict, relatives of 
persons killed or missing have the right to know the fate of their relatives.126 
A parallel obligation to investigate and where appropriate punish those responsible in 
respect of cases of alleged war crimes exists under IHL.127 Whenever there are reasons to 
query whether violations of IHL may have occurred in armed conflict as a result of a drone 
strike, such as the incorrect designation of persons as targetable, or disproportionate 
civilian harm, full adherence to accountability demands at least a preliminary 
investigation.128 Civilian casualties must be determined and should be disclosed. 
 
V. International Human Rights Law 
i. General considerations 
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The final substantive area that must be considered in assessing the legality of the use of 
armed drones under international law is, of course, international human rights law (IHRL). It 
is under IHRL that the right to life is most clearly protected, as set out in the various 
international and regional human rights treaties,129 and the rules of customary international 
law.130 The right to life is sometimes described as the “supreme right.”131 Indeed, certain 
violations of the right to life are considered to be war crimes or crimes against humanity.132 
As discussed in the next subsection, IHRL applies not only in peacetime but also in armed 
conflict, both international and non-international. As such, the right to life under human 
rights law forms the default legal norm applicable to the protection of people affected by 
drone strikes. 
As a general rule, international human rights law requires that any deprivation of life must 
be non-arbitrary.133 The non-arbitrariness standard defining the scope of the right to life has 
generally been interpreted in human rights jurisprudence to require that lethal force be 
used only as a last resort in order to protect life.134 Thus, Principle 9 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that 
“intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to 
protect life.” Indeed, article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
contains, rather than a general prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life, an exhaustive list 
of grounds on which it is permissible to use lethal force.135 
Under IHRL, any force must be necessary, that is, the least harmful means of achieving the 
particular legitimate purpose of protecting life. Whether that is the case is a factual 
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assessment. Other avenues should be explored first and only when they are shown to be 
inadequate can there be resort to force.136 Force must also be proportionate (that is, the 
potential harm in using force does not outweigh the legitimate protective goal pursued) . 
This entails making a value judgement. It is important to note that proportionality in this 
human rights law sense is a different test to the principle of proportionality in IHL (on which, 
see above). Moreover, intentionally lethal or potentially lethal force can only be used where 
strictly necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life: “[T]he police may shoot to 
kill only when it is clear that an individual is about to kill someone (making lethal force 
proportionate) and there is no other available means of detaining the suspect (making lethal 
force necessary).”137  
Proper precautions must also be taken to prevent, where possible, the resort to force. In 
McCann and others v UK, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the killing 
of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army by State agents was a violation of their 
right to life as they could have been arrested on their arrival in Gibraltar, where the 
operation took place.138 
Whether a particular drone strike satisfies these conditions must be examined on a case by 
case basis. It is important to emphasise, however, that, under these rules, alternatives to 
lethal force would need to be explored and shown to be inadequate for a drone strike to be 
lawful. In addition, it would need to be concluded that the use of lethal force is necessary on 
the basis that the person to be targeted constitutes an imminent threat to others.139 It is 
here that conflation of different legal standards across different regimes often poses 
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problems. It is important not to confuse this imminence requirement in IHRL with similar 
conditions under the ius ad bellum. As discussed above, according to the doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defence, a State can use force against another State where there is an 
imminent threat of armed attack emanating from the latter State. This, however, is a 
different legal threshold to the imminence requirement in IHRL. Whether a particular 
transnational drone strike is lawful would depend on demonstrating imminence in both of 
these senses in cases where the attacking State is claiming a right of anticipatory self-
defence.140   
ii. Application of human rights in armed conflict 
It is now well-established that IHRL continues prima facie to apply in time of armed conflict, 
alongside IHL.141 This has been confirmed in a number of decisions of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).142 Indeed, the general applicability of human rights obligations in 
armed conflict is confirmed by the presence of provisions relating to derogations in certain 
human rights treaties. Those provisions permit State parties to derogate in time of war or 
public emergency from some of their human rights obligations arising under those 
treaties.143 Such provisions confirm that, absent derogation, human rights obligations 
continue to apply in time of war or armed conflict. Thus, a State’s conventional human 
rights obligations will only cease where that State validly suspends the rights in accordance 
with the treaty’s derogation provisions. 
Where a particular drone strike falls within the context of an armed conflict, therefore, it will 
be governed by both IHL and IHRL. In certain cases, the right to life standard in IHRL might be 
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interpreted in accordance with the relevant rules on the conduct of hostilities under IHL, 
explored above. Thus, the ICJ has stated that, while the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
one’s life continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, what is an arbitrary deprivation 
of life under the ICCPR depends on the circumstances at hand and, in armed conflict, should 
be considered by reference to the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities.144 According to this 
view, where a State targets an individual in a drone strike that falls within an armed conflict, 
whether that State has violated its obligation not arbitrarily to deprive that individual of 
their life depends on whether the State has acted consistently with those IHL rules discussed 
above.  
However, the European Convention on Human Rights, as noted, does not express the right 
to life by reference to arbitrary deprivation of life. Rather, the ECHR provides for a closed list 
of permissible bases for depriving a person of their life.145 The extent to which one can read 
into this provision the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities is, consequently, much more 
limited than in the case of the arbitrariness standard found in the ICCPR and ACHR.146 
However, it is important to note that the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted 
the right not to be deprived of one’s liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention by 
reference to the IHL rules on detention in international armed conflicts.147 This was done 
despite the fact that the relevant provision, like the provision on the right to life, is not 
expressed by reference to arbitrary deprivation, but rather a closed list of permissible bases 
for deprivation of liberty.148  A similar interpretation of the right to life would allow the 
European Court to read the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities into the right to life under 
the European Convention. In any case, Article 15(2) ECHR permits derogation from this 
provision ‘in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’. This provision should, 
therefore, be used where States consider it necessary to resort to more permissive rules of 
IHL. 
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Where a drone strike is conducted outside the context of an international or non-
international armed conflict, IHL will not apply; in such situations, there can be no claim that 
a State’s human rights obligations must be interpreted in accordance with IHL. Instead, 
those obligations will apply according to their ordinary meaning as developed in human 
rights jurisprudence. That said, the arbitrariness standard remains context-specific and 
indeed has been applied in ways that are realistic to the context.149 There are, however, 
limits to this. Importantly for our current enquiry, the view that mere past involvement in 
planning attacks is sufficient to render an individual targetable even where there is no 
evidence of a specific and immediate attack, distorts the requirements established in 
IHRL.150 
The above discussion relates to the potential responsibility of the State using the drone. But 
what about the state on whose territory it is used? It should be remembered, as noted at 
the outset of this article, that States cannot consent to the violation of their IHL or IHRL 
obligations. A State that consents to the activities of another State on its territory remains 
bound by its own human rights obligations, including the obligations not actively to violate 
the rights of those within its jurisdiction itself, and also to ensure respect for human rights 
within its jurisdiction and thus to prevent violations of the right to life, including by other 
States operating on its territory, to the extent that it is able to do so.151 
iii. Extraterritorial application of the right to life 
The fact that drones have been used with lethal effects by States against individuals outside 
their territory raises the additional question of whether States can be held accountable 
under those human rights treaties to which they are party for their extra-territorial actions. 
Reference was made earlier to the status of the right to life, and the prohibition of the 
arbitrary deprivation thereof, as a norm of customary international law. In its customary 
form, at least the negative obligation not arbitrarily to deprive someone of their life appears 
not to be limited to application within a State’s territory. Indeed, the Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights does not contain a limitation clause on its geographical application and 
simply states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life’.152  
In addition, States are, in certain circumstances, bound by those human rights treaties to 
which they are a party in extra-territorial contexts. The fact that human rights treaty 
obligations can apply in principle to the conduct of a State outside its territory has been 
confirmed, inter alia, by the International Court of Justice,153 the UN Human Rights 
Committee,154 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights155 and the European Court 
of Human Rights.156 The applicability of such treaties is normally limited to those individuals 
within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a State party.157 It is clear that all persons finding themselves 
within the territory of a State are presumed to be within its territorial jurisdiction.158 
Moreover, it is clear from the case law that, where a State is exercising effective control 
over a part of another State’s territory, the former will be exercising ‘jurisdiction’ such that 
its obligations under those human rights treaties to which it is a party will apply.159 
Jurisdiction for the purposes of extra-territorial application of human rights treaties will 
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additionally exist where, absent such territorial control, the State exercises, through its 
agents, ‘authority or control’ over the specific individual abroad.160  
One of the key difficulties posed by drones is that the attacking State can engage in targeted 
killing without exercising effective control over territory or without having the individual in 
custody, leading to questions over whether such persons fall within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the 
attacking State for the purposes of their human rights treaty obligations. There is limited 
case law on this matter. In the Alejandre case, the Inter-American Commission concluded 
that the shooting down of two private US registered air planes by Cuban military aircraft in 
international airspace violated the right to life of the passengers.161 At the same time, 
however, in Bankovic, the European Court held that persons killed during aerial bombings 
by NATO of a radio station in Serbia did not fall within the “jurisdiction” of the participating 
States for the purposes of establishing whether they have violated the right to life.162 The 
broad sweep of this decision has, however, increasingly been narrowed in subsequent cases 
of the Court,163 and it is not clear that the position can be sustained. Indeed, the English 
High Court has held that “whenever and wherever a state which is a contracting party to the 
[European] Convention [of Human Rights] purports to exercise legal authority or uses 
physical force, it must do so in a way that does not violate Convention rights”.164   
It has been argued that the implication of this broader view of when an individual is within 
the jurisdiction of a state for the purposes of human rights treaties is that the deliberate 
killing of selected individuals through extraterritorial drone strikes is likely to bring the 
affected persons within the jurisdiction of the operating State.165 Pursuing this line of 
reasoning, where a State targets individuals abroad with lethal force, one can argue that it 
intends to exercise ultimate control over the individuals concerned, resulting in those 
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actions being governed by the State’s human rights treaty law obligations.166 Marko 
Milanovic is similarly of the view that the human rights treaty obligations of a State would 
apply to the deliberate killing of an individual through extraterritorial drone strikes.  167 
However, Milanovic’s reasoning is that the negative obligations owed by States under IHRL, 
e.g. the obligation not arbitrarily to kill, should extend unbound by territorial constraints.  
This argument is based on the view that, in treaties that contain a jurisdiction clause, the 
negative obligation to respect rights is to be treated differently from the obligation to 
ensure those rights and that texts can and should be interpreted such that only the latter is 
confined to matters within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the State as that term has come to be 
interpreted. This appears to be a normatively desirable and principled basis for holding 
States to account in such situations, and it is in line with the position as set out above under 
customary international law. Importantly, to say that a State has human rights obligations 
with respect to conduct outside its territory does not, therefore, automatically mean that 
those obligations are the same as those that arise within its territory.168 In principle, while 
control of territory means that a State has obligations not only to respect but also to ensure 
and to fulfill the human rights of those on the territory guaranteed by international law, the 
exercise of authority with respect to an individual by State agents in the absence of 
territorial control at a minimum triggers the State’s obligation to respect the rights of those 
individuals.169 
It has been held that human rights treaties “cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State 
party to perpetrate violations of [the treaty] on the territory of another State, which it could 
not perpetrate on its own territory.”170 The same must apply to the right to life under both 
custom and treaty law. In consequence, any positive action by a State, on its own territory 
or that of another State, should be carried out in compliance with its human rights 
obligations under both treaty and custom. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The legal framework for maintaining international peace and the protection of the right to 
life is a coherent and well-established system, reflecting norms that have been developed 
over the centuries and have withstood the test of time. Even though drones are not illegal 
weapons, they can easily be abused. The central norms of international law need not and 
should not be abandoned to meet challenges posed by terrorism and ‘new’ forms of 
conflict. On the contrary, the fact that drones make targeted killing so much easier should 
serve as a prompt to ensure a diligent application of these standards, especially in view of 
the likely expansion in the number of States with access to this technology in the future. The 
use of drones by States to exercise what is essentially a global policing function to counter 
potential threats presents a danger to the protection of life, because the tools of domestic 
policing (such as capture) are not available, and the more permissive targeting framework of 
the law of armed conflict is often relied upon instead. 
Though not inherently illegal weapons, drones do make the deployment of lethal force 
across borders much easier than before, and as such they pose significant risks to the 
protection of life. In this context the legal paradigm that is followed does make an important 
difference. If the assumption is that of a global non-international armed conflict, to which 
IHL applies as the dominant legal regime, then it becomes much easier to justify lethal force, 
than if one takes the default legal framework of IHRL as the governing regime. It was shown 
above that the notion of a global non-international armed conflict is a difficult claim to 
prove and in any event must be assessed against objective legal criteria rather than 
subjective self-interested claims. Moreover, even if IHL applies in a given situation, one 
should not be so quick to assume that IHL thereby modifies IHRL.171 The question must be 
also be asked in each case where armed drones are proposed to be used whether it is wise 
to do so, in addition merely to being legal. Such an approach is the only way in which force 
remains the exception, thereby protecting the right to life in the long term. 
There is an urgent need for the international community to gain greater consensus on the 
interpretation of the constraints that international law in all its manifestations places on the 
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use of drones. This is important not only because of the implications for those who currently 
find themselves on the receiving end of drones, but in order to keep a viable and strong 
system of international security intact.  A central component of such a security system is the 
rule of law. Drones should follow the law, rather than the other way around. 
The following fundamental principles should, it is proposed, form the starting point of a 
search for greater consensus on the regulation of armed drones:  
a) The current international legal framework is adequate to govern drone strikes; 
b) The right to life can only be adequately protected if all constraints on the use of 
lethal force abroad set out by international law are complied with individually and 
cumulatively, including the ius ad bellum, IHL (where applicable) and IHRL; 
c) International norms on the use of lethal force must not be abandoned or modified to 
suit the current use of drones; 
d) Any drone strike by a State outside of its own territory must comply with the ius ad 
bellum; 
e) Where a drone strike takes place within international or non-international armed 
conflict (a factual question governed by objective legal criteria), it is governed by 
both IHL and IHRL; 
f) Outside of the narrow confines of international or non-international armed conflict, 
any killing is governed solely by IHRL and must meet that body of law’s requirements 
of strict necessity and proportionality as those terms have been developed in human 
rights jurisprudence. 
g) There should be transparency surrounding all drone operations to enhance 
accountability.; 
These are merely a starting point, but the current authors would contend that the 
international community has a strong interest in ensuring that there is clearer agreement on 
the basis of our common security. 
 
